1. Introduction 1.1 The primary goal of international drug policy is to protect the health and welfare of the world's people [189] .
In pursuit of this humane objective, international drug policy has traditionally focused on limiting non-medical access to controlled substances by strictly regulating their cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and use. . [165] The large scale deployment of criminal laws and punitive law enforcement practices have not succeeded in reducing global illicit drug supply or consumption, and have themselves created significant harm [122] . One of the worst consequences of punitive drug laws and law enforcement practices has been the spread of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) through the injection of illicit drugs. People who use drugs by injection (IDUs) live in a social and physical "risk environment" shaped powerfully by how police behave, by what prevention and treatment services may legally be offered, and so ultimately by the drug control laws that set the rules [244].
1.2 Studies conducted throughout the world consistently find that punitive drug policing increases risky injection behaviour and interferes with IDUs' access to prevention and health care services. The harder question -for research and policy --is how to disentangle the effects of harsh law enforcement from the effects of the policies themselves. There are some obvious instances of laws themselves increasing the risk of HIV transmission: drug paraphernalia laws in the US prevent the establishment of syringe exchange programmes; Russia's drug control law bans the use of methadone in medication-assisted treatment for drug dependency. But there are also countries in which laws prohibiting drug use or possession are not actually enforced, and countries in which administrative alternatives to criminalisation, apparently benign, are enforced in a way that is more punitive to drug users than criminalisation. This difference between law on the books and law enforcement practice makes it difficult to rigorously document a correlation between harsh drug laws and HIV, let alone demonstrate that one causes the other, but there is a growing acceptance of the obvious: treating drug use as a crime and drug users as criminals is harmful to health, violates human rights, and fails to control illicit drug use.
[1] In theory, the countries of the world remain committed to the punitive drug control strategies associated with the major drug control treaties. In practice, many countries,
Impact on injection behaviour
The enforcement of drug control laws can create an environment marked by police surveillance, crime, mistrust, and violence [47] . In such risk environments, IDUs cope with the threat of police interference or arrest in ways that tend to increase their risk of acquiring or transmitting HIV. A large number of studies have shown that police often confiscate syringes or otherwise penalise syringe possession even where their possession is legal, and that IDUs are less likely to carry sterile injection equipment due to the fear of arrest [submission of Pun, 2011; 19, 34, 40, 90 34 121, 176, 245, 310349, 31, 45, 240] . The fear of encountering police while in possession of a syringe is particularly acute in countries where police enjoy a high degree of discretion in implementing criminal and public order laws [193, 197] 3.3 To evade police detection, IDUs hastily inject drugs [4, 91, 198, 268] . Hurried injection can increase risk of HIV transmission if IDUs share or reuse needles or syringes while rushing to inject drugs in public venues that grant some degree of privacy or camouflage (i.e. streets, parks, alleyways, stairwells, bathrooms, parking lots) [97] . Risk reduction requires time and resources. For example, cleaning a used syringe requires that it be flushed with water a few times and then flushed with bleach three times, leaving the bleach in the syringe for at least 30 seconds and flushed at least three times again to remove the bleach residue. Hurried or anxious injection reduces the likelihood of such risk reduction measures [40] .
3.4 To evade police, IDUs may move to even more hidden settings [171] . Such physical displacement is exemplified by "shooting galleries, " a term commonly used to describe hidden, indoor locations where IDUs can inject away from the watchful eye of local authorities or where people can access injection equipment without having to carry them on their person [55, 174, 86, 236] . In such settings, used syringes are often stored for future use [245] , while "professional" drug injectors may use the same syringe to inject multiple customers. In Ho Chi Minh City, for example, much of the drug injecting takes place in off-street shooting galleries, with professional injectors administering injections, often drawing the solution from a common pot [16] . The sharing or reuse of injection equipment in shooting galleries has been associated with HIV transmission in studies throughout the world [74, 55, 85, 58] , ranging from Bayamón, Puerto Rico [83] to Rajshahi, Bangladesh[140] . Indirect sharing may also occur during the hurried preparation of drug solutions or when paraphernalia needed to safely prepare drugs are not available [175, 277] .
3.5 Numerous studies from Australia, Canada, and the United States have documented an increase in the improper disposal of syringes due to the fear of arrest, with IDUs often simply dropping them on the street to avoid being stopped by police with used syringes in their possession [4, 68, 91, 269] . Such disposal increases the likelihood that non-sterile equipment will be picked up and used by others [198] . Drug users themselves know the risks of improper disposal. A study published by the Australian Injecting and Drug Users League (AIVL) reported that vast majority of IDUs surveyed reported concerns about safe disposal, called for better access to safe disposal sites, and took precautions to "disable" needles to prevent re-use [168] .
Impact on access to sterile injection equipment and health information
The criminalisation of drug use may not inevitably create a hostile climate for interventions that aim to reduce the harm of drug use and the spread of bloodborne disease among people who use drugs -but it often does so. The logic of drug criminalisation entails defining the person who uses drugs as a criminal, and leads many people to the conclusion that efforts to reduce the harm of drug use are condoning or even encouraging illegal behaviour. This logic has played itself out in high level policy-making, appearing in high level UN deliberations over the very use of the term "harm reduction" and in the behaviour of international donors and agencies. Over many years, for example, the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programme was barred by Congress from using its funding to support syringe exchange, which had important impact on country-level programming [130] . Similarly, the International Narcotics Control Board was, until recently, consistently critical of harm reduction efforts like syringe exchange programmes (SEP), and continues to view safer injection facilities as illegal [18] . At the national level, Submissions to the Global Commission on HIV and the Law described barriers to harm reduction approaches arising from the dominance of a prohibitionist approach [Submission of Suzuki, 2011] .
3.7 Punitive drug laws can interfere with public health and harm reduction in even more immediate ways. Laws that limit or ban the purchase or possession of syringes, or that forbid activities deemed to "encourage" drug use, can prevent syringe access programmes from being established. In the US, drug paraphernalia laws have been interpreted to forbid SEPs in some states [53, 280] ; in others, uncertainty or conflict over the law has impaired the ability of SEPs to operate effectively, [33] while formal legal approval has been found to increase the number of syringes distributed and reduce the rate of police harassment of programme staff and clients [32] . Interpreting Russian drug control law, the Federal Drug Control Service has concluded that operating syringe exchange programmes constitutes illegal incitement to drug use [213] . In Canada, Australia and other countries, drug possession laws have complicated or limited the implementation of supervised injection facilities [47] .
3.8 Even where syringe access is legal, it may still be hindered by laws and police practices. Widespread police interference with SEPs' operation is documented in several countries [148, 49, 225, 244] including the US, where police interference occurs regardless of state laws governing SEP operation [21] . IDUs in countries as varied as the US and Indonesia report reluctance to access SEPs due to the fear of arrest or confiscation of sterile syringes [90, 121, 310, submission of Gunawan, 2011] . IDUs may be particularly hesitant to access SEPs during police crackdowns -evidenced in Australia [197] , Canada[325, 326, 329] , and the US [77] . Studies have linked low access to SEPs due to police presence with elevated rates of syringe sharing among IDUs [4, 197, 245, 325] . Even when SEPs and syringe possession are legalised, police may continue to find reasons to harass or arrest people carrying syringes [305] .
3.9 Laws and practices that drive drug users underground also make it harder for health interventions to reach them [4, 245, 269] . In a criminalised environment, health service providers often find it difficult to reach IDUs to deliver prevention materials, diagnosis and treatment, and educational messages aimed at promoting health and preventing disease [39, 67, 75] . For example, when law enforcement authorities destroyed the informal settlement of Dorozhny in the Kaliningrad region of Russia, a known drug trading venue, drug use became more hidden. As a result, treatment options were lost, and public support for harm reduction services waned [307] . In heavily policed drug markets, service interruptions can occur because some IDUs avoid public contact with workers in order to avoid being identified as drug users [268] .
Impact on access to treatment services for injection drug use and HIV
People who use drugs, like other people in the community, may from time to time need access to the full range of health and social services, including income support, housing, general health care and vocational training [248, 153, 269] . As a consequence of criminalisation, people who use drugs are often formally or in practice barred from receiving such services [153] . For people recovering from drug dependency, or seeking to restart their lives in the community after a period of drug-related incarceration, these barriers can cause unnecessary suffering and even promote relapse. In this paper, however, we focus on two kinds of services with extremely well documented links to HIV: medication-assisted treatment for opioid dependence (MAT) and antiretroviral treatment (ART) for HIV.
3.11 MAT is proven to be effective in the prevention of HIV transmission and facilitating better ART outcomes [324] . Methadone and buprenorphine, prescribed for MAT, have been recognised by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as essential medicines [318, 342] . MAT is proven is proven to be an effective treatment for opioid dependence and to significantly reduce the risks of HIV and Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) and other harms associated with injection drug use [210] . According to the WHO, these medications should be "available within the context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate amounts [and] 3.14 Police harassment targeting service providers and patients is also a concern. Such behaviour curbs MAT availability in countries as varied as Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, India, Indonesia, and Ukraine. In those countries, outreach workers face the denial or confiscation of essential medicines, extortion, planting of evidence, and arbitrary detention [78, 130, 202, 268, 279, 321] . Police have searched the homes of MAT providers and threatened them with arrest if they did not provide patient lists [137] . In China, drug dependent individuals report police harassment and detention near methadone clinics [Submission of Shan, 2011] . In Odessa, Ukraine, buprenorphine patients reported that police officers regularly extorted money and threatened to plant drugs on them [228] . Meanwhile, in Malaysia, despite formal government endorsement for methadone treatment programmes in 2005, researchers found evidence of continuing police raids and arrests at methadone programmes [241] . Drug dependent individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, report reluctance to seek government health services, including for ART, for fear of police report [76] .
3.15 In addition to the systemic barriers to harm reduction described above, IDUs are structurally barred from receiving effective treatment because of non-integrated health systems and because IDUs may more frequently engage with justice officials than health officials. In Russia, neither drug dependence treatment nor ART are available at infectious disease hospitals and general hospitals[submission of Zhavorankov, 2011] . In Vietnam, Malaysia, and China, between 10 and 20 times as many IDUs were detained at compulsory drug detoxification treatment and rehabilitation centres than were engaged by clinics providing ART [316] . In some places, policies may prohibit provision of ART to individuals who are currently drug dependent [318] . As a result of a traditional non-integrated health system, health professionals may maintain erroneous and stigmatising beliefs about the ability of drug dependent individuals to comply with ART regiments [165] . Given the prevalence of tuberculosis co-infection with HIV, non-integrated services further weaken treatment effectiveness [317] .
Other law-related impacts on HIV risk for IDUs
The enforcement of punitive drug laws can have powerful negative impact on individuals who use drugs, but punitive laws and practices also affect drug users' families and friends. Prisons are high-risk sites for HIV transmission in most countries in the world. Incarceration puts those locked up at immediate risk, but can also endanger the communities they return to, both because of higher exposure to HIV and because large-scale drug arrests change the demographics of the most affected communities. Punitive drug laws and their enforcement is bound up with larger social attitudes, meaning that factors like gender, race, ethnicity and social class can influence who is arrested and incarcerated in ways that produce health inequalities. The stigma of drug use can affect not just users but marginalise whole communities. The evidence documenting these effects is less than in other areas covered by this paper, in large part because these kinds of effects are difficult -and controversial -to measure.
Incarceration
Prisons are a key site for HIV transmission through both sex and injecting drug use. 
Network effects
Increasing attention is being paid to the role of network dynamics in the spread of HIV among IDUs [111, 180] . In theory, a network of IDUs who share injection equipment only with others in their network may limit the spread of HIV, even if other networks become saturated with the virus [49] . However, high arrest and incarceration rates, among other police practices, may disrupt otherwise stable or non-injecting networks, thus facilitating the spread of HIV [113, 244] .
Social Identity at the Intersection of HIV and Drug Control
People who use drugs also have gender, racial or ethnic identities, and occupy places in the social hierarchy. Identity and social position shape vulnerability to HIV. These mechanisms contribute to the fact that HIV globally is an "uneven pandemic, " striking different parts of the world differently in ways that reflect and magnify the importance of social position to health [65] . People who use drugs may also identify or practice homosexual behaviour, or exchange sex for money. [189, 128] , but despite their references to health, and even drug treatment, the Conventions embody a criminal rather than public health approach to drug use. Any form of illicit drug use is treated as inherently pathological. The goal of the enterprise is not so much to reduce harmful drug use as to eliminate illicit use entirely -to produce, ultimately, a "drug-free world" [122] . Virtually all nations are parties to these treaties, and have adopted drug laws consistent with them.
4.2 Though they are all designed to adhere formally to the Conventions, national drug laws and policies vary considerably. Different cultural histories with drugs and different legal traditions produce different regulatory approaches. Moreover, the law on the books -statutes, regulations, court decisions, decrees -is often not closely related to how the rules are actually defined and enforced on the streets. As one observer cautioned, it is "hazardous" to generalise about the implementation of drug control legislation because the responses of police, prosecutors, courts and tribunals will be influenced by the general climate in a particular regional or locality and by the circumstances of the particular case [96] Some nations formally prohibit, vigorously pursue and harshly punish individual drug use or possession. Some continue to criminalise these activities in their statutes but have formally or in practice "depenalised" them. Others, meanwhile, removed criminal penalties for some level of use or possession entirely (called "decriminalisation"). No signatory to the Conventions can legalise drug trafficking, so the sale of drugs, even in small amounts, remains a crime.
4.3 The enforcement of criminal drug laws, like other criminal laws, is subject to national and international human rights norms. The Global Commission on Drug Policy notes that 'certain fundamental principles underpin all aspects of national and international policy. ' These include the rights to life, to health, to due process and a fair trial, to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, from slavery and from discrimination in the application of drug policy.
[122] The well-recognised "collateral" or "unintended" consequences of prohibitionist drug control policies have led to increasing attention to their tension with human rights (Costa 2008) . In 2010, for example, Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, emphasised the need for international drug policy to "respect, protect, and contribute to the fulfillment of rights, " specifically the right to health and the right to development. He released a statement that described the ways in which drug control policy could be "better synchronised" with protecting the human rights of drug users. In particular, the document cautioned that imprisonment for drug possession/ use that precludes drug dependency treatment could be tantamount to a violation of the right to health and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment [72] . The statement called for the integration of a human rights perspective in UNODC's work, specifically in dealing with drug control, criminal justice, and crime prevention [72] . The Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health took an even harder line, reporting that the criminalisation of drug possession and use neglects evidence-based approaches and inappropriately directs resources to result in "countless human rights violations" [126] .
4.4 In the remainder of this section, we briefly describe national drug policy, relying on available reviews of regional drug policy and practice, supplemented by information drawn from country studies. The paper intends to provide a snapshot, rather than a detailed account, of the diversity (and sometimes the contradictions) of national drug policies and practices.
Depenalisation vs. Decriminalisation
Depenalisation is a national or local decision to forgo criminal prosecution and/or punishment of drug possessors or users [141] . In a depenalisation regime, a nation will not enforce --i.e. arrest or prosecute those violating --the law prohibiting drug possession and use [125] . Many countries in the European Union have depenalised the possession and use of small amounts of illicit drugs. Depenalisation varies by region or administrative district within a country. Because depenalisation does not include a formal change in the law on the books, the practice of depenalisation can be vulnerable to a change in political climate and/or police discretion (Godinho & Veen, 2006) .
Decriminalising the possession of a minimal amount of drugs is a clearer legal alternative to criminalisation (Cook, 2010) . Decriminalisation removes drug use and/or possession from the sphere of criminal law (EMCDDA, 2008) , though in some instances the criminal penalties are replaced with equally punitive administrative mechanisms of punishment or forced treatment. True decriminalisation has the advantage of addressing the negative role of drug policy on HIV risk at its roots. Decriminalisation can be expected to allow most dependent drug users an opportunity to seek drug treatment without facing punitive sanctions; reduce negative interactions with law enforcement, the courts and the prison system; and facilitate the provision of harm-reduction services and therapeutic drug treatment for dependent drug users [125, 141] .
Europe
European drug policy exhibits diversity both in law on the books and enforcement strategies. Although some countries, most notably Portugal, have decriminalised drug possession, most European countries, both European Union (EU) members and non-members, continue to make individual drug possession a criminal act. Many of these countries, however, have instituted more or less formal policies of depenalisation. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) has reported that, in the EU, people are rarely prosecuted or punished for merely possessing drugs. Arrest and incarceration rates for drug users are low in relation to the total number of drug users, and the often-quoted maximum sentences are rarely, if ever, used [102] . A more recent study notes some divergence within the criminal justice systems, with police continuing to arrest users in a deterrence mode while courts generally pursue a depenalisation approach, dismissing cases, ordering probation or referring arrestees to treatment [103] .
4. , 2011] . In Azerbaijan, while the law enables a judicial authority to require treatment for an individual convicted of a drug related crime, no treatment or rehabilitation programmes exist for incarcerated individuals [submission of Mustafaeva, 2011] . A recent law enacted by Ukraine (N634) makes it a crime for individuals to possess as little as 0.005 grams of acetylated opium or "black tar heroin, " Ukraine's most widely used opiate. The new law reduced the legal limit to 20 times lower than what it had previously been and 100 times lower than the legal limit in Russia. Offenders face up to three years in prison [158] . As in Russia, police intimidation of people who use drugs is widely reported [230] . Poland retains one of the most punitive drug policies in Europe -possession of any amount of illicit substance could result in a threeyear prison sentence [159] . However, in May 2011, the Polish president signed a new law (Amendment 62.a) that enables prosecutors to avoid charging individuals in possession of small amounts of drugs with criminal penalty and instead in favor of mandating treatment if the defendant is found to be drug dependent.
4.8 Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan)
Drug policy and policing in Central Asia generally reflect their roots in the Soviet past [231] . Continuity of Soviet era policy is seen in the national drug laws of several Central Asian countries. For example, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan maintain policies found in Soviet era law: compulsory treatment of drug dependence, compulsory testing for suspected drug use, and mandatory registration of drug users [230, 51, 298] . Police and other internal law enforcement forces in the region are also widely characterised as politicised and corrupt and are known to participate in the drug trade [296, 230] .
4.9 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan pursue the most punitive law enforcement approaches to drug control in the region. In recent years, Kazakhstan has enacted legislation to stiffen penalties for drug sale and trafficking, and the government has expressed renewed interest in mandatory drug testing for students. 4.13 Historically, the US has pursued one of the most punitive drug policies in the world. As a consequence, it has experienced a steep rise in drug-related incarcerations since 1970, with more than half of the federal prison population currently incarcerated on a drug-related charge [26] . Punitive drug policies are also associated with a striking racial disparity in incarceration [138] . Related policies that mandate disproportionate penalties in drug cases, like the "three strike" or mandatory sentencing provisions, contribute to the high incarceration rates [26] . In the last two decades, diversion programmes like drug courts have become common, but only 35% of the federal drug control budget goes towards treatment and prevention [182 . In formal anti-drug policy, Canada seems to pursue an anti-drug policy that similarly emphasises enforcement. Recently, the country enacted mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offences [155] . Yet, researchers note that the country has slowly shifted away from the prohibitionist model shared with the US, spending 70% of its counter-narcotic budget on demand reduction rather than criminal enforcement. Incarcerated drug offenders constitute a much lower proportion of the total prison population than in the US [26] .
4.14 Data about injecting drug use and incarceration rates for the Caribbean are not readily available. In general, researchers find that injecting drug use is rare in the region, not counting Puerto Rico. Severe criminal penalties are administered for individuals convicted of illicit drug use [155] .
Asia
In Asia, a significant number of countries punish drug possession for personal use with imprisonment and/or compulsory treatment. Some countries penalise drug use independent of drug possession. Thailand, the Philippines (for specific classes like students and military) and Malaysia implement mandatory drug tests, which can lead to treatment or incarceration. Many Asian countries differentiate "addicts" from others convicted of drug offences and either mandate or allow courts to require treatment instead of jail time. Countries such as Cambodia and Nepal permit prosecutors to decide whether to prosecute or release first time offenders. In both countries, recidivism after treatment is punished with prison sentences. Some countries mandate treatment for first-time offenders of drug possession laws and issue jail time for subsequent offences. In the Philippines, for example, second-time offenders may face six to 12 years for violating possession laws. Still other countries, such as Pakistan, require jail time as well as compulsory treatment for individuals who violate drug possession laws.
4.16 While Asian drug control laws on the books illustrate varying degrees of prohibitionism, enforcement practices in the region reflect the continued pursuit of a punitive, prohibitionist regime. In Indonesia, individuals determined to be an "addict" are required to go through medical and social rehabilitation and are subject to prison sentences (Indonesia Narcotics Law, Articles 54 and 111 (2009) 
The Middle East and Africa
The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) has historically imposed severe criminal penalties for drug offences [159] . As a result, imprisonment and repeated imprisonment are common among the region's IDUs [2] . In recent years, some movement towards enabling prevention and treatment for arrested IDUs has become evident in the region. The IDPC notes that Iran presents one model for serious prevention and treatment for IDUs in the region. Since the 1990s, Iranian drug control policy adopted two drug control policies to respond to overcrowding in prisons: compulsory treatment and expansion of MAT and needle exchange programmes (NEP 4.20 While injection drug use has not historically been a major determinant for HIV infection/ transmission in SubSaharan Africa, a growing injection-driven HIV epidemic has emerged in recent years [submission of Adeolu, 2011; 76] . Injection drug use has been reported in over 30 countries in the sub-Saharan region [178] . Sub-Saharan Africa is the least documented region in the world with respect to drug crimes and incarceration rates. Drug policies in the region are historically punitive, characterised as a "quit or die" approach by at least one youth advocate [submission of Adeolu, 2011] . In Zambia, police reportedly enjoy broad discretion in enforcing drug laws and have arrested and detained family members, friends, and others when primary targets are not found [submission of Malembeka, 2011] . UNODC estimates that the proportion of drug users in the prison population in the 1990's ranged from 90% in Namibia to 3% in Nigeria with drug related convictions in the early 2000's ranging from 3.3% in Ethiopia to 56% in Mauritius; the reliability of these data, however, have been questioned [26] . Drug users in East Africa report that they face police repression and social exclusion. In informal reports, individuals living in Kenya and Tanzania report reluctance to seek government health services because of fears that they will be turned over to police [76] . In addition, buprenorphine and methadone prescribed for MAT are generally unavailable in the government health system [76].
Oceania
Australia and New Zealand have adopted a generally public health-oriented approach to individual drug use. Australia pursues a policy of depenalisation for possession of small amounts of certain illicit drugs. In Australia "the official response to drug possession and use is primarily a civil [not criminal] procedure" [26] . National drug policy gives police and courts the power to divert identified users from criminal proceedings to assessment, prevention, and treatment programmes 
Adoption of Harm Reduction Policies and Practices

5.1
Harm reduction refers to policies, programmes, and practices that focus on minimising the health risks involved with drug use, like the risk of drug overdose and transmission of blood-borne diseases like HIV and hepatitis. The defining features of harm reduction are the focus on preventing harm associated with drug use to people who use drugs, not ending drug use, and acceptance of the individual who uses or has used drugs [157] . Harm reduction has been controversial in drug policy because it makes no assumption that abstinence is the only, or even the best, way to reduce the individual and social harms of drug use. As a therapeutic practice, it aims to meet each user's individual needs. As a policy rubric, it defines drug-related harm, rather than drug use, as the primary target. There is considerable evidence that core harm reduction interventions like SEPs and (MAT for opiate dependence are effective in reducing HIV risks among IDUs. Other harm reduction approaches include adequate provision ofART, targeted educational programmes and ensuring access to condoms, and drug consumption rooms [155] . This paper focuses primarily on SEPs and MAT, the most widely used and best supported harm reduction methods. . In 2009, the WHO, UNODC, and UNAIDS identified nine interventions that "have the greatest impact on HIV prevention and treatment. " The combined "comprehensive package" includes both MAT and SEPs [340] . The Political Declaration of the 2011 United Nations General Assembly High Level Meeting on AIDS calls upon countries to consider expanding harm reduction programmes. Some form of harm reduction policy has been supported -either explicitly in national policy or otherwise provided -in 93 territories and countries. Seventynine of these countries support harm reduction in their national policy while 82 countries actually implement or allow harm reduction programmes [155] . While the best prevention or control of HIV epidemics among IDUs has occurred in countries that adopt harm reduction and reduce the punitiveness of drug laws and/or enforcement practices, the mitigating effects of harm reduction are also evident in countries that maintain relatively punitive practices. The countries with the worst injecting drug use-related epidemics are those where harm reduction policies have been rejected or stunted by punitive drug strategies.
5.6 Several European countries, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have adopted policy and enforcement changes that reflect a public health approach to drug use, including significant implementation of harm reduction. Although definitive evidence of causation is not available, in these countries HIV epidemics among IDUs have been prevented or controlled [205] . Prior to adoption of a harm reduction approach, HIV prevalence among IDUs in Edinburgh, Scotland was over 50%, with high reported levels of syringe sharing among IDUs. Targeted interventions for IDUs and harm reduction programmes such as SEPs, expansion of methadone treatment, and increased outreach were implemented in response to what was perceived as an injection-driven HIV epidemic. By 1993, six years after harm reduction services were provided, syringe sharing was no longer the norm and HIV prevalence among IDUs had sharply declined and stabilized [271] . In 2010, the HIV prevalence rate among IDUs in the UK was less than 5% [89].
5.7 There are countries that combine a punitive drug laws and law enforcement practices with the implementation of harm reduction programmes. In the US, where drug policy is made and enforced at the local, state and national levels, harm reduction co-exists, often uneasily, with punitive laws and policies. 5.10 In the nations with the worst epidemics of injecting drug use-related HIV, punitive policies have made it difficult or impossible to implement robust, sustained harm reduction efforts. The starkest example comes in the nation of the former Soviet Union, where injecting drug use is a major driver of HIV [submission of Askenov, 2011] . Although all countries in the region provide SEPs in at least some locales, and most provide MAT, coverage is severely inadequate and programmes are under constant threat of lost funding and police pressure [158] . Many of the countries in the region pursue punitive anti-drug policies, emphasising law enforcement and treatment of IDUs over prevention services. Russia, the region's dominant power, has been consistently and openly hostile to harm reduction in spite of its uncontrolled and disastrous epidemic of injecting drug use-related HIV. As recently as 2009, authorities warned against the "risks" of MAT and called SEPs "drug propaganda" [253] . Russian law does not provide for harm reduction services, and funding for such services is absent from the federal HIV programme [107] . The result is a morass of preventable suffering and death. HIV prevalence among Russian IDUs is over 37%, one of the highest in the world [274] -and much higher than rates found where harm reduction policies are in place.
Creating an Enabling Environment: What Countries Are Doing
6.1 The goal of minimising the individual and social harms of drug use animates the international drug control Conventions. Sadly, the pursuit of this goal through criminal laws and law enforcement approaches has itself been a source of enormous harm. A renewed commitment to the public health mission in drug policy requires that both the harms of drugs and the harms caused by efforts to control them be counted. The evidence we have reviewed here leaves little room for doubt that punitive drug laws, and especially punitive law enforcement practices, exacerbate the HIV risk faced by people who use drugs. A public health approach to drug use and drug dependency would not treat drug users as criminals, and would intervene to reduce vulnerability and risk wherever the evidence suggested that intervention is likely to be effective. Where criminal law remains an instrument for addressing drug-related harm, those who enforce the law must take explicit responsibility for the health-related consequences of their work. This includes affirmative efforts to harmonise the goal of controlling illicit use with the goal of assuring access to health care and harm reduction services; and ensuring that health services offered or managed by law enforcement and corrections agencies meet the standards generally applicable to such services in the community. "Harm reduction" on this view is not just an approach to working with drug users, but the ultimate goal of all efforts [48].
6.2 Countries around the world have responded to HIV and the problems with punitive drug control laws in a variety of ways, which we summarise as:
1. Decriminalising or depenalising individual drug use and possession;
2. Integrating harm reduction into law enforcement and drug control policy; and 3. Providing drug treatment and harm reduction services within the criminal justice system. 6.3 Evidence for the effectiveness of initiatives to reconcile law and enforcement and public health goals is limited, and the challenge of doing so is daunting. We describe efforts to harmonise punitive approaches with public health not as best practices, but as plausible steps forward.
Changing Basic Laws and Policies: Decriminalisation and Depenalisation
HIV prevention is part of the broader set of drivers that have led some countries to move away from punitive approaches to drug possession and individual use [186] . Less punitive approaches include depenalisation and decriminalisation. (See box above). Just as punitive policies have generally failed to substantially suppress drug use, removing criminal penalties alone leads to little or no increase in the prevalence of drug use or drug-related harms (141, 196] . While most existing research evaluates the effects of decriminalising small amounts of cannabis, evaluation of decriminalisation of other drugs for personal use in Portugal has similarly found no increase in drug use. In addition, decriminalisation in Portugal reduced overcrowding in prisons and reduced administrative burden in the criminal justice system [95] . As a result, a greater number of IDUs accessed treatment and the number of drug-related harms, such as overdose, in prisons declined [160].
6.5 Although it can do so, decriminalisation of small amounts of illicit substances does not always result in improvement to the HIV risk environment for IDUs. Certain Australian jurisdictions, for example, have decriminalised personal cannabis use only. Police diversionary programmes in the country primarily focus on diverting individuals discovered with cannabis although police diversionary programmes that cover other drugs also exist [44] . The Italian decriminalisation experience in comparison to the Portuguese experience is instructive in demonstrating the benefits of multi-pronged action, including decriminalisation. In 1975, Italy decriminalised the possession and use of all drugs. The Drug Act allowed users to carry a small amount of illicit drugs without facing punitive sanctions [270] . In practice, however, police continued to arrest drug users, charging them as traffickers. Treatment services were not founded on harm-reduction principles and exhibited limited effectiveness [270] . HIV infection among IDUs actually increased after the Act [270] . By contrast, the decriminalisation statute in Portugal provides for funding for drug treatment centres and introduced harm reduction services to dependent drug users including MAT and SEP [125] . After enactment of the Portuguese statute, the number of dependent drug users seeking treatment increased threefold and drug-related harms have significantly declined, including the incidence of HIV [125] .
Integrating Harm Reduction into Drug Control and Enforcement Strategy
To the extent that law enforcement continues to be a component of a strategy to reduce the harms of drug use, its negative effects on the health of people who use drugs can be reduced by better integrating health and law
Case Study in Decriminalisation: PORTUGAL
Background: On July 1, 2001, Portugal implemented legislation decriminalising the sale, possession and consumption of drugs, including cocaine and heroin for personal use. The policy has served as a test of the impact of decriminalising illicit drug possession and use on national drug-related health outcomes [141] . Personal use, according to the law, is defined as a 10-day supply of the drug for one person. Individuals discovered in possession of illegal drugs are not charged with a crime, but are liable to be referred to an administrative proceeding overseen by specialised drug commissions (CDTs), made up of law enforcement and health officials. CDTs (1) differentiate offenders suffering from drug dependency from healthy users, and (2) encourage addicted offenders to enter drug treatment. Individuals who are deemed "non-addicted" may be fined [12] .
Effects: Prior to decriminalisation, IDUs in Portugal had the second highest prevalence of HIV in the European Union [141] . Since the decriminalisation law when into effect, drug-related harms have substantially declined: the number of newly reported HIV/AIDS cases has declined significantly every year; the percentage of newly diagnosed HIV/ AIDS cases steadily decreased over the same time; and there has been no significant increase in new drug use [submission of Roque, 2011,141,95] 11).
enforcement interventions in a common strategy founded on respect for human rights. At best, this takes the form of what are often referred to as a "four pillars" model. This approach to drug policy combines prevention of new drug use, treatment of drug dependence, law enforcement and harm reduction. At least, it entails sustained efforts to educate and motive law enforcement officers to avoid treating people who use drugs in harmful ways. Where harm reduction is not voluntarily adopted, or where in other ways police continue to mistreat people who use drugs, human rights litigation has been useful in some places in enforcing change.
Enabling multisectoral collaboration
Efforts to formally and systematically integrate harm reduction into law enforcement have been successful in improving acceptance of harm reduction in law enforcement. First developed by the Swiss government and implemented in the late 1980s, the four-pillars approach to drug policy is credited with producing a drop in HIV incidence among IDUs in the first ten years of its implementation [257] . Later adopted in Vancouver, Canada the four-pillars approach has since been widely adopted as a model for integrated harm reduction policy [206] . In Vancouver, collaboration between police health workers has been identified as a key outcome of the approach [204] . Also, a change in local law enforcement culture surrounding injection drug use can be seen by the cautious support of a number of police for the city's first supervised injection site. City police have further demonstrated improved acceptance of the harm reduction pillar of the four-pillars approach in changes to police policy, including police non-attendance to non-fatal overdose [266] . It is important to note that implementation of the four-pillars approach in Vancouver has not historically been even across each "pillar" (prevention, treatment, law enforcement, and harm reduction). A police crackdown on people who use drugs by injection in Vancouver, "Operation Torpedo, " resulted in widespread rights violations and curtailed use of available harm reduction services. The event caused one local advocate to characterise the city's implementation of the four-pillars approach as "a tree trunk [law enforcement] and three toothpicks" [142] . The numbers of IDUs who access harm reduction services today in Vancouver are unknown [155] . The Ministry of Health credits the city's sustained and multi-level response as contributing to a decline in HIV prevalence among IDUs in the region [169].
6.8 The four-pillars approach is not the only model. Consistent with practice at the intersection of policing and mental health [333] , some jurisdictions have developed interdisciplinary teams or co-located services as a means for moving people detained with drugs from the criminal justice to the health care and social services systems. In Western Australia, public health officials, social services and law enforcement officers created Drug Action Teams (DATs) to curb criminal activity related to drug use while increasing IDUs' access to drug treatment. These interdisciplinary teams were tasked with providing local police with harm reduction training. The DATs also equipped local police with referral cards with drug treatment contact information to distribute to drug users. The DATs enabled the two sectors to collaborate in a shared goal -improving access to harm reduction services [212] . 6.11 Perhaps two of the most important outcomes of police training are improving police understanding about drug use, including reducing stigmatising attitudes about drug users, and improving across-agency collaboration. In Australia, for example, the National Community Based Approach to Drug Law Enforcement provided police officers in four trial sites with training in harm reduction for IDUs. Trained officers demonstrated willingness to direct people who use drugs towards harm reduction services instead of resorting to arrest or confiscation [212] . The change in and police response was monitored with respect to whether changed attitudes resulted in greater referrals [165] . Some IDUs seeking treatment from referral services noted that police had referred them to treatment centres. The programme was subsequently expanded and comprehensive harm reduction training was provided to all police officers in two of the four trial sites. Trained officers spoke highly of a trainer who had formerly used drugs and the experiences shared with them [212] . Most importantly, however, health officials and police reported significant improvements in the quantity and quality of inter-agency collaboration [212] .
6.12 Research shows that police officers are receptive to harm reduction training, "particularly when that information is coupled with content directly relevant to the health of the law enforcement trainees and is delivered by a trusted source" [78] . 6.14 The power of courts to push for better quality and access to health services is especially clear in cases that arise out of the prison system. The European Court of Human Rights has ordered the governments of Russia and Ukraine to pay damages to the families of people who used drugs and died in pretrial detention, emphasising the need to improve health services available to all detainees, including IDUs [318, 345] .The European Court of Human Rights has also held that a failure to provide requisite care to detained IDUs, including access to drug dependency treatment, can constitute a violation of the right to health and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment [300, 207] . A complaint from a Russian national that Russia's legal bar to MAT constitutes a violation of human rights law was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in November 2010 [283] .
Drug Treatment and Harm Reduction within the Criminal Justice System
Court-supervised or instigated drug treatment
Programmes that divert drug arrestees from prison to treatment are found throughout the world. The value -and justice -of these programmes depends on how people are assessed and referred to treatment, how much actual say they have, and the quality and fit of the treatment. The administrative systems of compulsory referral used in a number of counties in the former Soviet Union and Asia, discussed earlier in this paper, have been strongly criticised on each of these points. In a number of Western countries, diversion programmes have been embedded in the criminal justice system with judges taking on the tasks of assessing, referring and even supervising individuals in drug treatment. Though the drug court approach is continuing to grow, it too is subject to basic questions of efficacy and fairness arising from the use of criminal justice rules and standards to make decisions that are essentially medical and therapeutic in nature [48].
6.16 There are over 2000 drug courts operating in the US today, with more planned. Drug courts allow drug arrestees a chance to avoid criminal sanctions, such as incarceration, so long as they maintain attendance in drug treatment centres and do not commit other crimes while in treatment [109] . US drug courts typically operate on a diversionary (pre-plea) basis, meaning that the individual has the option to avoid prosecution if s/he agrees to a court designed treatment regimen, but faces criminal prosecution if s/he does not succeed [272] . In accepting the offer of treatment, the arrestee generally is treated as voluntarily "exiting" the judicial process, meaning that he or she agrees to accept the drug court judge's decisions (for example, on the treatment modality to be used, or punishments for noncompliance within the programme) without a right to appeal. Little evidence exists to prove their effectiveness in long-term drug dependency treatment, and their costs are high [272, 42] . Research from eight high-performing counties, identified by indicators such as program completion, reincarceration, and re-arrest, finds that four core strategies determine drug court success. "High-performing" shared these traits: (1) fostered participant engagement by making treatment easy, monitored participant progress, and sustained cooperation among participants; (2) cultivated buy-in among key stakeholders, including a knowledge base and core group of local experts; (3) capitalised on the role of the court and the judge, including the judge's ability to facilitate communication between stakeholders and sustain political support for the program; and (4) created a setting which promoted a high quality treatment system that responded to individual patient needs, and broad financial and political support for the programme [108]( 6.18 Diversion of arrestees from jail to treatment makes sense from a public health standpoint, but it is not clear that judges and parole or probation staff are properly trained, equipped or monitored to make treatment decisions competently or fairly [5, 30] . Many drug courts treat all drug use as pathological, though many if not most people arrested for drug use are not drug-dependent. Anecdotal reports and some evidence indicate that US drug court judges tend to disfavor MAT in favor of abstinence-based treatment, despite the evidence of MAT's effectiveness [251, 222] . Judges may have little training in substance abuse, and little appreciation of its chronic nature, leading to premature determinations of treatment failure or non-compliance and neglect of harm reduction. This concern is consistent with data showing that drug courts eventually incarcerate many and in some cases most of the dependent IDUs in the programme, and rarely if ever provide for harm reduction services [30, 3] . All these concerns are heightened by the inherently coercive nature of the process, and the lack of outcome accountability for the decision makers.
Providing harm reduction in prison
Prisons are being recognised as essential sites for harm reduction services. Burduzha, 2011] . MAT in prison has also been proven to reduce HIV transmission among people using drugs in prison [166, 94] . In prison, MAT has also been associated with other positive outcomes such as reduced drug use and reduced recidivism for participating IDUs [273] . Spain provides an example of how effectively a combination of SEP and MAT in prison can improve the HIV risk environment in prison for IDUs. Since the late 1990s, Spain has provided both SEPs and MAT for drug-dependent inmates in some prisons [165, 10] . In 2001, the national head of prisons issued an edict requiring SEP implementation in all Spanish prisons [166] . By the mid-2000s, 82% of incarcerated dependent IDUs received MAT [165] . As a result of the harm reduction services in prison, new cases of HIV among incarcerated IDUs dropped 17% between 1992 and 2009 [10] . Evaluations of SEPs in prison have found no adverse events after implementation, e.g., overall increase in injection drug use and violence involving needles [190] .
Conclusion
7.1 Global drug policy stands at a historic crossroads. There is no doubt that drugs cause significant harm to health, but this is true of both legal and illegal drugs [214] . At the same time, there is no doubt that many drugs, both legal and illegal, offer benefits to those who use them, even if only hedonistic ones, that make them desirable and sustain demand for them. Simple prohibition is evidently incapable, in most settings, of overcoming this demand, at least in a manner consistent with justice and human rights [196] . Moreover, punitive strategies of drug control themselves cause enormous harm, including but not limited to the harms that have been described in this paper [122, 126] . To achieve its welfare goals, drug control policy must follow the public health evidence. The challenge of drug control today is to adopt regulatory methods that minimise both the harms caused by drug use and the harms caused by drug control.
7.3 The road to a healthier drug policy is neither straight nor smooth, but the journey can be postponed no longer. The Vienna Declaration presents a plausible way forward, a set of steps that reflect the evidence reviewed in this paper [1] . They include:
• Submitting current drug policies to the scrutiny of a transparent, evidence-based review.
• Implementing -and rigorously evaluating -a science-based, public health approach to minimising the individual and community harms of illicit drug use, including the harms caused by the laws and other interventions we use to do so.
• Decriminalising drug use, scaling up evidence-based drug dependence treatment and abolishing ineffective compulsory drug treatment schemes that violate the human rights of people who use drugs.
• Removing legal barriers to, and providing adequate funding for the implementation of comprehensive, evidence-based HIV interventions, including harm reduction.
• Meaningfully involve people who use drugs in developing, monitoring and implementing services and policies that affect their lives. This means financial support and legal standing for organisations representing people who use drugs.
7.3 Global society is not likely to achieve consensus on the morality or value of drug use. If we can agree on the goal of minimising drug-related harm, and to accept the guidance of scientific evidence, it should be possible to pursue reforms that will do a far better job than the strategies in place today. 
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